Materialised identities: Cultural identity, collective  memory, and artifacts by Heersmink, Richard
Materialised Identities: Cultural Identity, Collective
Memory, and Artifacts
Richard Heersmink1
Accepted: 2 July 2021/
# The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021
Abstract
This essay outlines one way to conceptualise the relation between cultural identity,
collective memory, and artifacts. It starts by characterising the notion of cultural
identity as our membership to cultural groups and briefly explores the relation between
cultural and narrative identity (section 2). Next, it presents how human memory is
conceptualised on an individual and collective level (section 3) and then distinguishes
between small-scale and large-scale collective memory (section 4). Having described
cultural identity and collective memory, it argues that cultural identity is materialised in
the environment when we retrieve and construct collective memories by integrating
information from our biological memory with information in artifacts or in other
people’s embodied brains (section 5). This essay ends with analysing how materialised
cultural identities are constructed by using a niche construction approach from evolu-
tionary biology (section 6).
1 Introduction
Cultural identity can be characterised as the membership to a cultural group such as a
nation, religion, political group, generation, or family. These groups have historical
narratives that characterise them in important ways and ensures their continuity over
time. Shared memories of events constituting these narratives are referred to as
collective memories, i.e., memories that a collective shares. Social interactions with
other people as well as artifact-scaffolded practices embedded in cultural institutions
remind us of events in these narratives in a way that is not possible without external aid.
I will argue that some collective memories can be extended and distributed across
embodied agents interacting with artifacts and other people. These collective memories
are then not merely shared amongst group members, but the content and processes of
collective memories can be distributed across two or more people. Cultural identity is
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materialised in the environment when we retrieve and construct collective memories by
integrating information from our biological memory with information in artifacts or in
other people’s brains. To better understand how our cultural identities are materialised
in institutions, social practices, and artifacts, I draw on niche construction theory from
evolutionary biology and identify three types of cultural niche construction processes,
namely the building, transferring, and using of cultural artifacts. By doing so, I bring
into contact theories of collective memory and niche construction.
2 Cultural Identity and Narrative Identity
Cultural identity, characterised as the membership to a cultural group, is not an intrinsic
property of persons, but is a relational social property, as it is developed and maintained
in relation to cultural groups. This type of identity has been defined by social psychol-
ogist Henri Tajfel as “an individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social
groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of his group
membership” (1972, p. 292). So, it is a sociocognitive structure with affective and
normative significance to the individual. Our cultural identity has many facets as
individuals belong to various cultural groups, having to do with nationality, regionality,
religion, profession, hobbies, sports, music, art, gender, socioeconomic class, political
groups, generation, family, and other groups with their own culture. One might, for
example, self-identify as Australian, Melbournian, professional philosopher, soccer
supporter, alternative rock fan, photography enthusiast, male, middle class, communi-
tarian, Generation X-er, member of a family, etc. These groups have distinct cultures,
meaning that they are characterised by a distinct set of practices, values, and norms.
Cultural identities are fluid and sometimes change over time. One might move to a
new country or city, change profession, develop an interest in painting, and one’s
religious or political views may change. So, membership to some of the cultural groups
one self-identifies with can (and sometimes do) change over time. As suggested above,
we do not have one cultural identity but usually self-identify with a number of different
cultural groups. Our overall cultural identity may be seen as the totality of our different
cultural identities. This overall cultural identity is fluid and the nested pattern of the
cultural groups we self-identify with shifts over time (Jenkins 2014). Also, membership
to some of these cultural groups is not the result of conscious agency, whereas
membership to others is. For example, one has no choice in where, when, or in which
family one is born, whereas one’s religion, profession, hobbies, and political views are
(at least to some degree) the result of one’s conscious choices.
There are different degrees of commitment to one’s membership to cultural groups
(Ellemers et al. 2002). As mentioned above, membership to cultural groups is
characterised by a set of practices, values, and norms. Two people may both be born
and live in Australia and, in that sense, both have an Australian national identity, but
one of them may feel a stronger commitment to the practices, values, and norms that
characterise Australian national identity. Likewise, two people may both self-identify
as protestant, but may have different commitments to the practices, values, and norms
that characterise their religious identity. Cultural identity thus means different things to
different people. Importantly, there is often not a universal agreement about what it
means to have a particular cultural identity. What I mean here is that there is no
Heersmink R.
universal agreement amongst group members about what it exactly means to be
Australian, communitarian, protestant, etc. Membership to these cultural groups exists
on a continuum. There is, for example, individual variation in the dimensions that
people attribute to being Australian such as the language and accent, worshipping of
sport, cuisine, commitment to Western democratic values, multiculturalism, knowledge
of its history, etc. Whilst there may be some core commitments characterising group
membership, there are usually a lot of variables that group members do not agree upon.
The expression of cultural identity is done through institutions, practices, and
artifacts. Universities, museums, libraries, archives, courts, churches, sport events,
and music festivals as well as the practices and artifacts associated with these cultural
institutions allow us to express our identities.1 So, for a person to express her protestant
identity, she may go to church and participate in a service, praying, singing, reading
from the bible, while being surrounded by the many religious artifacts and symbols. Or,
for a person to express her identity as an alternative rock enthusiast, she may visit rock
music festivals, dress in a particular way, dance in a particular way, and talk about
particular topics. Participating in these institutions and practices enables us to express
who we are, which often has a strong affective relevancy to the person, creating a sense
of belonging. Artifacts, in particular, often play key symbolic roles in the expression of
cultural identity. For example, one way to express American national identity is
through the American flag, which features prominently on (government) buildings,
airports, and people’s houses, and is also used as a bumper sticker, fridge magnet, and
on clothing. It is an important symbol of patriotism, national identity, and is even used
in metaphorical expressions like “Rallying around the flag” (Schatz and Lavine 2007).
As Tajfel (1972) wrote, cultural identity is not a mere sociocognitive construct, it has
affective significance, too. Participating in social activities and expressing one’s cul-
tural identity often causes us to feel a certain way. Religious ceremonies, commemo-
rative services, sports events, political rallies, music festivals, and many other activities
that express, affirm, and remind one of one’s cultural identity often induce strong
affective responses in individuals. During such activities, we may, for example, feel
pride, joy, sadness, anger, a sense of unity, reassurance, and other affective states.
Philosopher Robert Wilson (2001, 2005) argues that affective states are sometimes
socially manifested, which means that such states can only be realised (or manifested)
when participating in group activities. On this view, individuals engage in some forms
of affect only insofar as they constitute part of a social group. Wilson calls this “the
social manifestation thesis”. Importantly, the expression of cultural identity also has a
mnemonic function, as participating in these institutions and artifact-scaffolded prac-
tices reminds individuals of who they are and which cultural groups they belong to.
Cultural identity is distinct from but overlaps with narrative identity. One’s narrative
identity is constituted by a large cluster of integrated memories of personal experiences
(Schechtman 1996, 2011). It can be characterised as a subjective, affective, and
personal story containing a mostly accurate chronological depiction of a series of
connected events and experiences that constitute the self and provides continuity of
self to some degree (Heersmink 2020b). The person in question is the protagonist in
these memories, which are meaningfully connected through a process of emplotment
1 However, a reviewer pointed out that these institutions, practices, and artifacts do more than just express our
cultural identities. They also have other, more practical functions.
Materialised Identities: Cultural Identity, Collective Memory, and...
(Ricoeur 1984). When prompted, either by oneself or by someone else, one should be
able to think through or articulate (parts of) the narrative. What makes you the
particular person you are and what distinguishes you from other persons is your unique
autobiographical narrative, your remembered experiences. And this narrative ensures
that you experience a sense of personal continuity over time to some degree.
The relation between cultural identity and narrative identity is complex. One way to
conceptualise this relation is as follows. The content of one’s personal memories and
narrative are determined by the experiences one has and the activities one engages in.
This, in turn, is shaped by the various cultural groups one self-identifies with. For
example, a soccer fan will go to soccer matches or watch them on TV and thus have
memories of those experiences, a protestant will go to church, baptise her children, and
so on, and will have memories of those experiences. Expressions of cultural identity
often become personal memories in an overall narrative. Also, the values and norms
that characterise group membership will shape one’s behaviours. Protestants or com-
munitarians will (often) act in ways that are consistent with their moral code, thereby
promoting some actions but not others. This, too, will shape the sorts of experiences
one has and thus also the content of one’s personal memories and narrative. I want to
suggest that cultural and narrative identity are two layers in an overall identity system.
Conceptually, one can identify and distinguish between cultural identity and narrative
identity, but in actual persons they mesh and are layers in one’s overall identity
system.2
Like persons, cultural groups have a narrative that characterises their identity and
ensures continuity over time.3 Cognitive psychologist Qi Wang points out that: “Just as
autobiographical memory serves a primary function of defining the individual self,
collective memory sustains a community’s very identity and makes possible the
continuity of its social life and cultural cohesion” (2008, p. 307). Nations, regions,
religions, professions, sport teams, music genres, art genres, social classes, political
groups, generations, and families all have historical narratives that characterise them in
important ways (László 2007; Liu and László 2007). American national identity is
characterised by events in its past such as the waves of immigration from different
countries in the 18th, 19th and twentieth century, the civil war, WW1, the great
depression, WW2, the cold war, the civil rights movement, the counterculture revolu-
tion, 9/11, and many other important historical events. Protestant identity is
characterised by its history, including the actions of important historical figures such
as Martin Luther and the protestant reformation in the sixteenth century, resulting in the
current protestant principles. And the identity of alternative rock depends on its history,
including its origin in the 1970s, its heyday in the 1990s with the formation of bands
like Nirvana, Pearl Jam, and Smashing Pumpkins and the shows and festivals they
played at. In order to understand the current practices, values, and norms characterising
a cultural group, one must look at its history.
2 The subject of experience (Gallagher 2000; Schlicht 2018), which is the entity that has experiences, is also
part of this larger identity system. Briefly, the relation between these can be seen as follows. Expressions of
cultural identity are experiences that the subject has and some of these are consolidated in the embodied brain
and can become part of a larger narrative identity.
3 Whilst both persons and cultural groups have narratives, these narratives are ontologically different. One
difference is that personal narratives are about experiences of individuals with one main character, whereas
cultural narratives are about experiences of groups of individuals with more than one character.
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Before moving on to discussing individual and collective memory, it is helpful to
distinguish between the identity of the group as a whole and the identity of the persons
who are members of that group. The focus in this paper is on the identity of the persons
who are members of cultural groups and on how that identity is influenced by being
part of a group. In the next two sections, I will look at how the historical narrative of
groups is remembered.
3 Individual and Collective Memory
Theorising about memory occurs at various levels, including at the level of the
individual and the level of the group. On an individual level, cognitive psychologists
distinghuis between “episodic memory” and “semantic memory” (Tulving 1972).
Episodic memories are memories of events one personally experienced. For example,
I may episodically remember driving to university this morning, ordering a book on
Amazon last week, or attending my PhD graduation ceremony. When we remember
our personal past episodically, we travel back in time, as it were, and visually re-
experience the event (Tulving 1985, 2002). These types of memories are accompanied
with what cognitive psychologist Endel Tulving refers to as “autonoetic conscious-
ness”, which is characterised as follows:
“Autonoetic consciousness (self-knowing) is the name given to the kind of
consciousness that mediates an individual’s awareness of his or her existence
and identity in subjective time extending from the personal past through the
present to the personal future. It provides the characteristic phenomenal flavour of
the experience of remembering” (Tulving 1985, p. 1).
This type of consciousness can be described as the feeling of travelling back in
subjective time as to reexperience an event and is a distinguishing characteristic of
episodic memory. Semantic memory – by contrast – is propositional in nature, provid-
ing knowledge-that about past events. This includes knowing the meaning of words,
language, concepts, and norms, as well as general knowledge domains such as politics,
geography, and history. Semantic memory also includes memories about one’s own
past. For example, I semantically remember that I was born in 1981, graduated high
school in 1997, and read Aldus Huxley’s Brave New World in high school. However, I
am unable to retrieve any visual or experiential information about those events. I know
that I experienced those events but cannot remember what it was like to be born,
graduate from high school, or read Huxley’s Brave New World. Episodic remembering
has a distinct phenomenal flavour that is lacking in semantic remembering. This
distinction is therefore sometimes cashed out in terms of remembering versus knowing.
Theorists in the situated cognition paradigm argue that individual memory is not
merely realised in the biological brain but is often situated and sometimes extended and
distributed across the embodied brain and environmental resources (Clark and
Chalmers 1998; Clowes 2013, 2017; Michaelian and Sutton 2013; Heersmink 2015).
The notes we take during a conference in our notebook or on our laptop, for example,
may later help us to remember the argument and content of the talks we attended,
extending our semantic memory. The photos we take during our holidays, may later
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help us to remember the experiences we had when on holiday, extending our episodic
memory (Sutton 2009; Fawns 2019; Heersmink 2020a). In such cases, the external
artifact does not trigger the retrieval of a fully formed biological memory. Rather,
information in the embodied brain and in the artifact are integrated into a memory.
External artifacts can provide informational properties and functions that complement
the memory capacities of the embodied brain (Sutton 2010). And when those comple-
mentary properties and functions are appropriately integrated into the memory system
of the embodied brain, the artifact and agent can be seen as an extended and distributed
memory system (Heersmink 2015). On this view, the content and processes of distrib-
uted memories are neither located exclusively in the brain nor exclusively in the
artifact, but in the interaction between the two (van Dijck 2007).
On a group level, social scientists distinguish between various sorts of social or
collective memory. This type of theorising goes back to the work of French sociologist
Maurice Halbwachs (1992/1925) who develops the notion of “collective memory”,
conceptualising how groups remember their past. In an influential paper and building
on the work of Halbwachs, Jan Assmann (1995, 2011) distinguishes between two sorts
of collective memory, namely “communicative memory” and “cultural memory”. To
be as precise as I can, I will quote Assmann’s definitions in full.
“Communicative memory is non-institutional; it is not supported by any institu-
tions of learning, transmission and interpretation, it is not cultivated by specialists
and is not summoned or celebrated on special occasions; it is not formalized and
stabilized by any form of material symbolization but lives in everyday interaction
and communication and, for this very reason, has only a limited time depth which
normally reaches not farther back than 80 years, the time span of three interacting
generations” (Assmann 2011, p. 38).
Simplifying, one can characterise communicative memory as living memory that is
communicated during everyday informal social interactions. Cultural memory - by
contrast - contains information that goes back deeper into the past and is more formal
and institutionalised. Assmann writes:
“This information, however, is not committed to everyday communication but
intensely formalized and institutionalized. It exists in forms of narratives, songs,
dances, rituals, masks, and symbols, specialists such as narrators, bards, mask-
carvers, and others are organized in guilds and have to undergo long periods of
initiation, instruction, and examination. Moreover, it requires for its actualization
certain occasions when the community comes together for some celebration or
other” (Assmann 2011, p. 38).
Again simplifying, one can characterise cultural memory as formalised and
institutionalised historical knowledge materialised in artifacts, practices, and memory
specialists. So, when you talk to your friend about the global financial crises of 2009, it
is an example of communicative memory, but when you participate in a commemora-
tive service to celebrate the end of WW1 or read about it in a history book, it is an
example of cultural memory.
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I want to problematise the analytical and empirical value of Assmann’s distinction.
Whilst these categories may be helpful in identifying clustered characteristics in the
overall conceptual landscape of collective memory, there are too many grey areas and
there is too much overlap for the categories to be analytically helpful. Roughly,
communicative memory is about remembering the recent past through informal con-
versations, whereas cultural memory is about remembering the deeper past through
formalised methods such as rituals, commemorative services, textbooks, documen-
taries, etc. However, the recent past is also remembered through formal methods such
as monuments, textbooks, documentaries, and Wikipedia pages. For example, there are
many public spaces, monuments, and commemorative practices to remember the
Yugoslav wars in specific ways. The Yugoslav wars happened in the 1990s and so
are still in living memory. Conversely, the deeper past is also remembered through
informal conversations. We may informally talk about the fall of Rome, the rise of the
Han dynasty, or the French revolution over drinks with our friends or colleagues.
Admittedly, knowledge about the deeper past is often first obtained through lectures,
textbooks, documentaries, newspapers, or other popular media. The main way to learn
about these events is through cultural artifacts, as they are no longer in living memory.4
I do find the timeframe of living memory versus historical memory helpful. One
could (in principle) talk to a person who has lived through WW2 and, in that way,
obtain first-personal information about what it was like to live through WW2, but one
cannot talk to a person who lived through the American civil war. The distinction
between living memory and historical memory is relevant for group identity, because
the recent past is often more important than the deeper past for the identity of the
group5 (Manier and Hirst 2008). For example, the Dutch collectively commemorate the
end of WW2 on the 5th of May each year (which is when the Dutch were liberated by
the allied forces), but not the end of the Dutch-Portuguese War which ended in 1661.
The last 80–100 years are, in most cases, more important in shaping the present identity
of a group than what happened in historical memory.
Episodic and semantic memory systems interface with the wider cultural world in
various ways. Cognitive psychologists David Manier and William Hirst (2008) develop
a taxonomy of collective memories based on the distinction between episodic and
semantic memory. They distinguish between “collective episodic memory” and “col-
lective semantic memory”. When a family of five goes on holiday to Australia, they all
have episodic memories of the same events. So, they share similar episodic memories,
which may be talked about during reminiscing, perhaps aided when viewing photos or
videos of their holiday. Episodic memories may similarly be shared amongst a group of
fans of a sports team, a religious group, members at a political rally, or a group of
friends at a music show. Collective semantic memories - by contrast - are not experi-
ential in nature but provide knowledge-that about past events. For example, collective
memories about WW2 are important for national identity in many countries, collective
memories about the suicide of Kurt Cobain in 1994 are important for the identity of
alternative rock fans, and collective memories about the death of George Floyd in 2020
4 Some oral cultures such as those of the Australian Aboriginals do transfer stories across many generations
purely through social story telling. I’ll get back to this in section 6.
5 I say “often”, as there are also cases in which the opposite happens. A reviewer pointed out that human rights
violations in Guantanamo happened a few years ago, but that didn’t shape American identity in a strong
manner, which is more influenced by older events in this respect.
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are important for the identity of civil rights movements. Also, note that not just any
collective memory is relevant for group identity. Most British people will remember the
global financial crisis of 2009, but it is not essential for being British. However,
memories of the terrorist attacks in London in 2005 as a cultural event are much more
central to British identity. So, memories must not only be shared amongst group
members, but they must also be relevant to the group in some distinct way (Hirst and
Manier 2008).
Some collective semantic memories are purely propositional, for example remem-
bering that the Dutch-Portuguese War which ended in 1661. Other collective memories
go beyond mere semantic or propositional content. We obtain memories through visual
media like the news, photos in newspapers, documentaries, YouTube videos, and so
on. These memories are not merely propositional in nature, but do have some sort of
experiential component. Memories obtained through external visual media like photos
and videos can be seen as a derived form of episodic memory. For example, I did not
personally experience the death of George Floyd in 2020 and, in that sense, have no
episodic memories of it. I only remember what it looks like in a video of it. My
embodied presence is lacking in such experiences and therefore memories of such
disembodied, but still visual, experiences can be seen as episodic in a derivative or
mediated manner. I will therefore refer to such memories are “mediated episodic
memories”, as they are memories of events mediated through visual means. Such
memories go beyond mere propositional knowledge but are not full-blown episodic
either. A further distinction can be made between collective memories of events that
happened before and during one’s lifetime. WW2 happened before my lifetime, but
George Floyd’s death happened during my lifetime. I have not lived through events
constitutingWW2, whereas I have lived through the media attention and controversy of
George Floyd’s death as well as the civil right protests caused by it.
4 Small-Scale and Large-Scale Collective Memory
Theorising on collective memory focusses on small-scale groups and on large-scale
groups (Michaelian and Sutton 2017). Small-scale groups include, for example, a
couple, a family, or a group of friends or colleagues. Large-scale groups include, for
example, a religious group or a nation. Consider first an example of a small-scale group
remembering an event relevant for their identity as a group. When trying to remember
the name of the show they saw during their honeymoon, a husband and wife could not
remember that name individually. But when they give each other cues, the husband and
wife integrate information stored in their individual brains to jointly reconstruct the
memory (Harris et al. 2014). Note that this is an example of what Manier and Hirst
(2008) call collective episodic memory.
Wife: And we went to two shows, can you remember what they were called?
Husband: We did. One was a musical, or were they both? I don’t ... no ... one
...
Wife: John Hanson was in it.
Husband: Desert Song.
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Wife: Desert Song, that’s it, I couldn’t remember what it was called, but yes, I
knew John Hanson was in it.
Husband: Yes.
In this example, the processes of remembering as well as the content of the constructed
memory are distributed across both the husband and wife. They form an emergent and
integrated memory system that knows more than the sum of its parts. Similar sorts of
distributed memory systems may exist in families, a group of friends or colleagues, and
other small-scale groups that know each other well. Psychologist Daniel Wegner
(1986) refers to such integrated cognitive units as transactive memory systems. A
conservative reading of small-scale collective memory would merely suggest that
remembering is causally influenced by other people. A more radical interpretation,
one that I endorse, would suggest that the content and processes of remembering are
distributed across members of the group. On this view, memory systems are not
realised exclusively in an embodied brain, but are realised by two (or more) people
whose memory systems are properly integrated.
Collective memories pertaining to the identity of larger groups can likewise be
distributed across two or more members of a group. For example, drawing inspiration
from the above example, one may image the following conversation between a husband
and wife about why Australia Day is commemorated on January the 26th.
Wife: I know Australia Day is commemorated on the 26th of January.
Husband: Right, it has something to do with when the first British settlers
arrived.
Wife: I can’t quite remember when that was.
Husband: Wasn’t that somewhere in the eighteenth century.
Wife: I think it was in 1788.
Husband: Yes, that’s right.
In this case, a collective semantic memory is constructed by integrating information
stored in different brains. The take home message here is that we sometimes remember
events in the historical narrative of the cultural groups we self-identify with only when
interacting with other people in a particular way. It is important to note that distributed
and transactive memory systems are limited to a relatively small number of people. In
larger groups, such transactive remembering becomes intractable, although perhaps not
completely impossible. Collective memory in larger groups thus takes a different form,
in that one may merely share similar semantic memories about the past of the group,
but these are not distributed.
In a thoughtful review of the collective memory literature, Hirst and Manier (2008)
outline a spectrum in which scholars argue that collective memories are located in the
individual or in the world. Some sociologists argue that collective memories are located
in the world (Irwin-Zarecka 1994; Olick 1999), whereas psychologists tend to argue
they are located in the individual. Sociologist Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, for example,
argues that “a collective memory - as a set of ideas, images, and feelings about the
past - is best located not in the minds of individuals, but in the resources they share”
(Irwin-Zarecka 1994, p. 4). Theorists claiming that collective memories are located in
the world do not deny that individuals do the remembering. So, when I learn the Dutch-
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Portuguese war ended in 1661 by reading it in a history book, that collective memory is
first located in an artifact and then also in my brain. Artifacts obviously do not
remember themselves, only humans do. For theorists focusing on collective memories
in the world, the salient issues are social processes and mechanisms that govern what
and how is remembered at the group level. For those theorists, the relevant questions
are: What is included in national archives and history books, and who decides what is
included, which monuments and statues are erected and which ones are torn down,
which events do journalists and historians write about, how do collective memories
spread across a community, etc. Such questions can be political and normative in
nature.
Psychologists, on the other hand, often utilise a “methodological individualism”,
which suggests isolating and demarcating the individual from its environment. On that
view, all cognitive and affective states, including collective memories, are located in the
individual. Memories, on this view, are never stored or located in the world. Such
theorists focus on processes of encoding, storage, and retrieval, as they unfold in the
individual’s embodied brain. The view I defend is that when collective memories are
properly distributed across two or more individuals or across an individual and an
artifact, they are located in both. We thus need to enlarge the unit of analysis from an
individual to an individual interacting with other individuals or artifacts. Philosopher
John Sutton points out that such a view invites use to focus on memory traces as
dispositional states in larger distributed systems. He writes:
“Such dispositional states can take the form of information or habits or artifacts,
and may be widely distributed across different people and across records or
instruments or rituals, with no single individual or archive necessarily holding
more than partial or incomplete traces or resources: these are then merged or
compiled often on the fly, in the moment, for some particular purpose, and then
perhaps recoded or reconsolidated or restored in transformed state” (2008, p. 31).
Merely looking up or asking for information about historical events would not count as
a genuine case of extended and distributed memory. For information to be appropri-
ately integrated into the memory systems of its users, it must satisfy a number of
conditions (Heersmink 2015). We must reciprocally interact with the information, it
must be easily accessible, the relation between the resource and person must be durable,
the information must be trustworthy, easy to find, and easy to interpret. Merely looking
up information in a history book or Wikipedia does not rank high on some of those key
dimensions (Heersmink and Sutton 2020). In particular, looking up information that is
created by someone else has a one-way causal information flow structure preventing
deep cognitive integration into onboard memory systems, which requires two-way or
reciprocal information flow (Clark 1997). In such cases, collective semantic memories
are not extended. They are then first located in the world and then also in the individual.
Collective memory in this sense is not about groups as cognitive agents that remember
in the same way as an individual remembers. Rather, it is about how individual
members of a cultural group learn about events related to the group by interacting with
artifacts such as history books, webpages, documentaries, etc. Such processes of
information flow and the spreading of collective memories across a group are important
to better understand and I’ll identify some of these processes in the final section.
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5 Materialised Identities
Followingmedia theorist Sherry Turkle (2007), Heersmink (2018) has referred to artifacts we
use to aid us in remembering our personal past as “evocative objects”. Examples of such
objects include photos, videos, journal entries, souvenirs, mementos, and other memory-
evoking objects. When interacting with evocative objects, we typically integrate information
in the embodied brain and in the object to construct a personal memory, thereby allowing us
to remember our personal past in a way that is quite different from remembering our past
without the aid of such objects (Heersmink 2020a). This is important to better understand in
itself, but also because it means that the memories constituting our narrative identity are
extended and distributed across embodied agent and evocative objects. And because personal
memories are the building blocks of the narrative, our narrative is not realised by the brain
alone but is realised by and distributed across embodied agents interacting with evocative
objects. Therefore, our narrative identity is a distributed and relational structure (Heersmink
2017). A similar phenomenon occurs with cultural identity. So, if the collective memories
constituting one’s cultural identity are distributed, then cultural identity is distributed, too.
Evocative objects aid us in remembering our personal past. As we have seen,
artifacts also play an essential role in remembering our cultural past. Archives, mu-
seums, history books, documentaries, webpages, and other media, aid us in remember-
ing the history of our cultural groups, including those associated with our nationality,
regionality, religion, profession, hobbies, sports, music, art, gender, social class, polit-
ical groups, generation, etc. I shall refer to artifacts that aid us in remembering events
constituting the historical narrative of cultural groups as “cultural artifacts”. Evocative
objects tend to be personal objects such as photos, videos, clothing, jewellery, books,
music, art, souvenirs, etc. Whereas cultural artifacts tend to be public objects such as
monuments, architecture, webpages, documentaries, history books, and other media.
However, public objects can also evoke personal memories (e.g., a monument may
evoke a personal memory of the previous time you visited it), and personal objects can
evoke collective memories (e.g., a history book you own may evoke a collective
memory of WW2). So, these categories of memory-evoking objects overlap.
Let me end this section by giving one specific example of how family narratives are
materialised in artifacts. Anthropologist Kate Pahl (2004) performed a two-year ethno-
graphic study of narrative practices in family homes. During her observations and
interviews, she finds that “artifacts acted as conduits for narratives” (2004, p. 343). For
example, in one family, the grandfather had worked in India building railway tracks
and used to make train models. Pahl writes: “The trains were displayed in a glass
cabinet in the front room. The original train, made by Mary’s grandfather, operates as a
memento of the family history of building the railways in India (…) and was used by
family participants to evoke emotional links to the past” (p. 347–350). The train was
first given to Mary by her grandfather and then later given to her son Edward, who now
collects trains, including those made by his great-grandfather. Mary’s grandfather
moved from Ireland to India to work on Indian railways. Mary grew up in India but
later moved back to England. For Mary and Edward, the train symbolises and reminds
them of their complex family history of migration. So, the cultural identity of the family
is materialised in artifacts. Cultural identity is thus not an intrinsic property of embod-
ied brains, but a relational and distributed structure.
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6 Constructing Cultural Identities
Up to now, I presented (the relation between) cultural and narrative identity, and argued
how different forms of distributed memory are essential in the constitution of these
identities. In this section, I draw on the conceptual resources of niche construction
theory to better understand how we construct our cultural identities.
Niche construction theory is a relatively recent approach in evolutionary biology,
arguing that some organisms actively construct their niche, which has developmental
and evolutionary advantages (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). The niche of an organism can
be characterised as all the ecological dimensions that have an impact on, or relation to,
its survival and reproduction. Such dimensions may include, for example, food avail-
ability, mate availability, resource availability, temperature, the presence of predators,
parasites, and chemicals, etc. “Niche construction refers to the activities, choices, and
metabolic processes of organisms, through which they define, choose, modify, and
partly create their own niches” (Laland et al. 2000, p. 132–133). Termites, for example,
build mounds, providing colonies with a safe, regulated environment to reproduce and
raise their offspring. Doing so, changes the selection pressures to which termites are
exposed. Animal niche construction is primarily practical in nature, focussing on their
biological needs, meaning that it has to do with foraging, shelter, reproduction, and
survival. Human niche construction is different because it goes beyond mere practical,
biological purposes.
Human niche construction is threefold:
– Practical: niche construction processes relating to our biological needs (e.g.,
constructing houses, infrastructure, agriculture).
– Cognitive: niche construction processes relating to our cognitive capacities (e.g.,
constructing the printing press, books, maps, writing, computer systems).
– Cultural: niche construction processes relating to our cultural identities (e.g.,
constructing monuments, museums, art, churches, institutions).
These sorts of niche construction processes can overlap. Building houses, for example,
is a practical type of niche construction but also has cultural components, in that houses
are often not merely for shelter but also express, affirm, and remind one of one’s
cultural identity. Cognitive niche construction is the process of modifying and utilising
parts of the environment as to aid us in completing our cognitive tasks. Humans are
quite good at this and have developed many ways to store and use information in the
environment. We have developed numeral systems, cartographic systems, diagrams,
symbols, alphabets, and languages as well as artifacts to store that information such as
clay tablets, papyrus scrolls, books, newspapers, abacuses, computers, and the internet.
Most theorising in cognitive niche construction focusses on how we use informational
artifacts to complete problem-solving tasks such as navigating, calculating, and re-
membering facts (Clark 2006; Sterelny 2010; Kendall 2011; Sinha 2015; but compare
Fabry 2018). As far as I am aware, it has not been used to theorise about our cultural
identities.6 In a sense, all human niche construction is cultural in nature, in that
6 Richard Menary (2014) helpfully argues that there is an aesthetic niche going beyond cognitive niche
construction but does not theorise about its relation to cultural identity.
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constructing artifacts and institutions is an essentially cultural activity. Artifacts are
therefore often referred to as material culture. However, in this essay, the phrase
“cultural niche construction” refers to niche construction processes relating to our
cultural identities.
I identify three broad classes of cultural niche construction processes:
– Building of cultural artifacts and institutions which function as to store collective
memories (e.g., building a monument, archive, writing a history book, webpage,
newspaper article).
– Transferring of collective memories through institutions, social practices, and
artifacts, either within a generation or across generations.
– Using of cultural artifacts which may be done on an individual level (e.g., looking
up some historical description of an event in a textbook or webpage) or a collective
level (e.g., a commemorative service at a monument).
The building of cultural artifacts and institutions, which are later used to help us
remember events in the historical narrative of cultural groups, is a ubiquitous process.7
Monuments, statues, plaques, and public spaces are built by governments to commem-
orate important events in national and regional history. Journalists write newspaper
articles and documentary-makers make documentaries about important cultural events.
Organisations create archives, libraries, and museums, biographers write books about
important historical figures, and historians write books on the history of cultural groups
having to do with nationality, regionality, religion, profession, hobbies, sports, music,
art, gender, social class, political groups, generation, and families. So, there is a wealth
of cultural information materialised in artifacts and institutions that contain collective
semantic memories.
Once these artifacts and institutions are built, they are used by people within that
generation. Information is then transferred horizontally. Cultural artifacts and
institutions are also often passed on to the next generation. Information is then
transferred and passed on vertically. To better understand the vertical transfer of
collective memories through institutions, social practices, and artifacts, I will draw on
a concept from cognitive niche construction, namely what philosopher of biology Kim
Sterelny (2003) refers to as “downstream epistemic engineering”. He argues that we do
not just engineer our current cognitive niche through creating books, maps, and
computer systems, but by doing so, we also engineer the cognitive niche of the next
generation. We are born in the informational environment that our parent generation
has created, our parent generation was born in the informational environment their
parent generation has created, and so on. This provides us with enormous cognitive
benefits as we do not have to invent, discover, or develop the same information twice.
Once information (e.g., a map) is created, it can be passed on to the next generation
who often improve that information. Evolutionary biologists Eva Jablonka and Marion
Lamb (2005) refer to the transfer of symbolic information such as language, numbers,
and maps from one generation to the next as a “symbolic inheritance system”. So, we
do not just inherit genes from our parents but also an informational niche, resulting in
dual inheritance channels, one genetic the other cultural-informational.
7 Building sometimes involves reproducing an artifact, for example when a book or photo is reproduced.
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Downstream epistemic engineering and symbolic inheritance are the core mecha-
nism of many collective memory systems, particularly of collective semantic memory.
Information about the historical narrative of cultural groups is passed on from one
generation to the next. In some cases, the cultural lineage of specific artifacts can date
back thousands of years. For example, due to the writings of Greek historian Herod-
otus, we now know a good deal about ancient Greek culture. His book The Histories,
which was published sometime between 426 and 415 BCE and written on papyrus, is
generally considered the first historiography written in a narrative form. It tells about
ancient traditions, politics, geography, and wars between various cultures that were
known in Greece, Western Asia, and Northern Africa at that time. The Histories has
been translated in many languages and is still used across the world to better understand
ancient Greek culture. It is almost 2500 years old and so has a linage spanning
approximately 125 generations. The Histories is perhaps an unusual example but there
are many cultural artifacts containing information about past events of specific cultural
groups. Trajan’s Column in Rome, completed in 113 AD, commemorates Roman
emperor Trajan’s victory in the Dacian Wars. It contains an elaborate spiral bas relief
representing the wars between the Romans and Dacians. Herodotus’ The Histories has
many copies in different languages and so its lineage has a branching structure, whereas
there is only one Trajan’s Column and so its lineage is linear.8 There are, likewise,
many bas reliefs in publicly accessible places in both Western and non-Western
cultures, depicting important historical events.
Significantly, stories about the cultural past are also passed on verbally. One of the
most impressive examples comes perhaps from Australian Aboriginal cultures. These
lack a systematic written language and so their main method for transmitting
information about their cultural past is through story telling. Geographer Patrick
Nunn (2018) writes that various Aboriginal stories claim Fitzroy Island on the Great
Barrier Reef was connected to the mainland. This information is important for Austra-
lian Aboriginals because they have a deep spiritual connection to their land. Data from
geology confirms this was the case at least 10,000 years ago. If true, it seems as though
stories can convey accurate information about events going back 500 generations.
Interestingly, it shows that oral histories can contain information about events deeper
into our past than information contained in artifacts (e.g., books or bas reliefs).9
More contemporary forms of downstream epistemic engineering and symbolic
inheritance include webpages, YouTube videos, documentaries, news media, and
popular science magazines. For example, the history of the Netherlands has an elabo-
rate Wikipedia page, hundreds of YouTube videos (of varying levels of detail and
quality), hundreds of documentaries, many items in both scientific and popular history
magazines, and various discussions on internet fora. Smaller-scale cultural groups such
as fans of alternative rock, sports teams, or political groups have, likewise – albeit on a
much smaller scale – webpages, YouTube videos, items in news media, and in
8 But since the invention of photography, there are now also many photographs of the bas reliefs and so its
lineage is now also branching.
9 This, of course, has to do with written language being invented approximately between 3400 and 3100 BCE
in Mesopotamia. Bas reliefs date back much deeper into the past. The oldest petroglyphs (images pecked into
the walls of caves or other rock surfaces) date back to approximately 30,000 years ago. Petroglyphs are much
older than written language but are (for contemporary scholars) often difficult to interpret. So, they no longer
support collective memories of cultural events.
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scientific and popular science magazines, depicting their history. Not all members of
cultural groups engage with these cultural artifacts in the same degree. But the
collective memories are there to tap into for those who are interested.
The use of cultural artifacts as to remember events in the historical narrative of
cultural groups is done on both an individual and collective level. Individuals may visit
a monument, statue, public space, archive, library, or museum, watch a documentary,
read a history book or newspaper article, and by doing so, be reminded or learn about
important events in the history of cultural groups. Sometimes, with particularly impor-
tant events, we collectively participate in a commemorative service. For example, in
Australia and New Zealand, people collectively partake in a commemorative service on
Anzac Day, a national day of remembrance, during which all Australians and New
Zealanders who served and died in all wars, conflicts, and peacekeeping operations are
commemorated. These include WW1, WW2, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and
other armed conflicts. During such services, often held at war memorials around the
country, there are commemorative addresses, wreath laying, hymns, the sounding of
the Last Post, observance of one minute’s silence, and the national anthems are played.
These services are broadcasted live on TV and play an important role in Australian
national identity (Donoghue and Tranter 2013). Such artifact-scaffolded practices
embedded in cultural institutions remind us of events constituting these narratives in
a way that is not possible without external aid.
Finally, during such services, collective memories about wars are retrieved from
memory, often supplemented with information from other people’s memories of war
(e.g., from the speeches given by veterans and other people). Such services have a
strong affective significance for most participants, particularly for those who partici-
pated in the wars or have lost people in the wars. Some affective states, or the specific
form they take, are only manifested during such services (Wilson 2001). Such affective
states are (to varying degrees) shared across the group, in that most participants will feel
similar (Huebner 2011; Von Scheve and Ismer 2013). The sharing of emotions (e.g.,
grief, sadness, sense of unity) is important for one’s sense of cultural identity, creating a
sense of belonging.
7 Conclusion
This essay has conceptualised one way to look at the relation between cultural identity,
collective memory, and artifacts. Social interactions with other people as well as
artifact-scaffolded practices embedded in institutions help us to remember past events
in the historical narrative that characterises our cultural identity. I argued that cultural
identity is materialised when we retrieve and construct collective memories by inte-
grating information from our biological memory with information in artifacts and other
people’s brains. To better understand how our cultural identities are materialised, I
drew on niche construction theory from evolutionary biology and identified three types
of cultural niche construction processes, namely the building, transferring, and using of
cultural artifacts.
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